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ABSTRACT.Since the early 1960's, 44 states have passed legislation
that offers preferential property tax assessments to farmers.By most
accounts, these programs are intended to preserve farmland.Yet,
writers on the subject have argued that the preferential assessment
simply does not work to prevent the sales of agricultural land.In
light of the popularity of the program, a search for a new policy
justification has begun.One alternate justification is that the
program serves the purpose of redistributing tax burdens toward a more
ideal level of equity or fairness.Given a plethora of writings on
the farmland preservation goal, the emphasis here is on the equity
objective.The history, mechanics and popular issues concerning
Oregon's program are examined in order to provide a broader base of
knowledge to judge the preferential assessment.
1INTRODUCTION
Since the rapid urban growth era following World War II, farm
land supplies have declined in the United States.While some people
debate whether or not farmland is really a social problem, the
majority of state legislatures have decided that the property tax can
be modified to preserve farmland.At the present time, 44 states have
property tax programs that give a preferential assessment to farmland.
Each of these programs is designed to provide tax savings to farmers
in the hope that they will keep their land rather than sell it to the
highest bidder and/or to simply shift the tax burden away from
farmers, based on some concept of equity.
While many studies have evaluated the preferential assessmentss
effectiveness in preventing farm sales, very few have addressed the
program in terms of equity.The intent of this paper is to explain
the effects of preferential assessment in terms of equity or concepts
of fairness.The first step is to show how the preferential
assessment may be considered as a social tool of equity distinct from
a social tool of land use.Secondly, it will be shown how the Oregon
preferential assessment works to maintain a certain level of equity.
Thirdly, while it is clear that the preferential assessment can at
least affect the equity of tax burdens in Oregon, it will be argued
that some of these effects are not in accordance with traditional
views on equity.Finally, some potential modifications of the
preferential assessment will be offered that more closely satisfy the
traditional goals of equity.
2FROM LAND USE TO EQUITY
Two basic themes of research exist concerning the preferential
assessment of agricultural land.One is the criticism of the
program's effectiveness in preserving farmland from urban sprawl.The
other, a much less cormion approach, is to evaluate the program on its
effectiveness in attaining goals of equity.While the emphasis of
this paper is on the equity goal, a brief description of past research
can help clarify the difference between the two themes, as well as
demonstrate the value of using equity as an objective.
Research Under Land Use Goals
The initial situation that stimulated public awareness of the
preferential assessment of farmland was the continuing downward spiral
of acreage under farmland, in spite of the program.It was estimated
that by 1980 the supply of farmland was declining at a rate of 390,000
to 760,000 acres per year.While this estimation does not include the
addition of new farmland from technological advances, a consensus
among researchers suggests that farmland supplies are declining
rapidly (Conrad 1983, 194).The land speculator, according to some,
has been given the blame for the decrease in farmland acreage.
Economist Philip Raup, in a 1975 article entitled "Urban Threats to
Rural Lands," stated that there were some very strong incentives for
creditors and developers in the housing market to prefer urban sprawl
to compact development.Raup explained that house values depreciate
over time while land values appreciate; so, for a sounder investment
for the future, the creditor and developer would be in favor of large
3lot and surburban development, generally referred toas urban sprawl
(Raup 1975, 373).
Despite the decreasing acreage in farmland, the incentives for
creditors/developers to purchase land, and the fact that 44 states
have passed preferential assessment strategies, the majority of
analysts are not convinced that preferential assessment of
agricultural land is the appropriate approach to curb urban sprawl.
In the widely referenced 1976 Council on Environmental Quality report
Untaxing Open Space, it was argued that the main reason for a farmer
to sell his land is not based on tax burdens.For example, a survey
in New Jersey indicated that the farmer's age, lack of an heir and
other social factors were more important than taxes in influencing a
farmer to sell his/her land (Regional Science Research Institute 1976,
53).On this basis, a farm tax relief program cannot be expected to
halt the sales of farmland.
Other critiques on the effectiveness of the preferential
assessment in terms of farmland preservation emphasize the
relationship between the landowner and the potential buyer.One
argument that is generally representative of several articles on the
subject was offered by the regional scientist Neal Roberts in 1980.
Roberts identified the major factors involved in a developer's
decision to buy land.Assuming that a developer is a rational and
profit-seeking individual, he/she will offer a bid that is somewhat
less than the discounted net present value of the property.If the
landowner sets a price that is considerably less than the developer's
future expectations from the land, a sale may occur (Roberts 1980, 4).
Roberts said that preferential assessment would not make the farmer
4less likely to sell.On land where the property taxes are high,
without a preferential assessment the developer's holding costs from
the time of purchase to the time of development would be high.In
turn, the developer would offer a lower bid for the land.This lower
bid might make the farmer less likely to sell the property.
Conversely, on land that is preferentially assessed, the developer may
project that the preferential treatment might be maintained after the
sale, thereby reducing the future holding costs.Consequently, the
developer might offer a higher bid for the land.In both cases, the
sale will depend largely on the price offered by the buyer, and the
price is dependent on the buyer's expected return as well as holding
costs.Because the preferential assessment of agricultural land
potentially may lower a developer's future holding costs, it may
influence the developer's decision to buy, thus induce more sales of
farmland--just the opposite of the law's intention (Roberts 1980, 4).
Roberts, the Council on Environmental Quality and others have
argued that the preferential assessment should be re-evaluated in
terms of its effectiveness in preserving farmland.The basis of their
argument lies in the fact that, while the preferential assessment is a
benefit to farmers, it is also a cost to non-farmers.Equation 1
shows how the property tax rate rises for all property oweners when
the total assessed value is lowered by a preferential assessment on
farmland.
Tax Rate = Desired Revenues
Total Assessment Value (1)
If the the costs of increased property tax rates to non-farmers cannot
be justified on the grounds of preserving farmland, the popularity ofthe preferential assessment suggests that some other objective is
being served.This other objective, it has been argued, is to
redistribute tax burdens in a manner that is in accordance with
certain principles of equity or fairness (Ladd 1980, 19-20; Roberts
1980, 6).
Research Under Equity
Since the most past research has been on the preferential
assessment's effectiveness in preserving farmland, the equity goals
have been largely ignored.This neglect may reflect the fact that
equity is a subjective concept that has a variety of interpretations,
thereby rendering it less testable by empirical analysis.But there
has been some research done to show how the preferential assessment
can be considered effective if some common principles of equity are
used.These principles apply to the popular perception that farmers
are being "taxed out of business."
In 1980, Robert E. Coughlin illustrated in a graph how proponents
of the preferential assessment may be justified in the belief that
without the program farmers may receive very high tax burdens compared
to other landowners (Coughlin 1980, 47).
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Figure 1.Free market value and farm use value of land by
distance from city center.Adapted from Coughlin
(1980, 48).In Figure 1, line a represents the assessments on land based on
free market determinations of property value.These assessed values
decline as distance from the city center increases.Line b represents
a farm use value (preferential assessment) based on the income derived
from agricultural land.The basic assumption is that farmland income
is less site related than non-farmland income.But given that
assumption, without a preferential program, the farmer located near
the city may have a much higher tax burden than a non-farmer, in terms
of their income or ability to pay.For lands further from the city
the difference between the landowners' ability to pay becomes smaller
until point c, where market and farm-use value are essentially the
same.
Under a preferential assessment program, the farmers could
receive a tax savings through lower assessments (represented in
Figure 1 as the area under line a and above line b).But to acquire
these savings, the farmers need to persuade legislators and other
citizens' that the distribution of tax burdens would bemore equitable
with a preferential assessment program than without it.Two arguments
are offered in support of this idea.The first, which was alluded to
earlier, is that property tax burdens should be in line with the
landowners' ability to pay.In most cases, ability to pay is
associated with income as the basic criteria.The second argument is
that property tax burdens should be in line with the benefits received
from property tax financial services (Regional Science Research
Institute 1976, 80-81).To understand the "ability to pay principle," it is helpful to
refer back to the explanation of Figure 1.If a farmer near the city
center can convince a legislator that his/her tax burden is high
compared to another landowner with the same income, he/shemay have a
strong equity case for preferential assessment.For example, without
a preferential assessment two landowners may have the same incomes but
if one of them owns farmland he/she may be taxed considerably higher
than the other.Dating back to the early 1900's, this equity argument
states that if both landowners are of equal "ability to pay" they
should, in turn, pay the same taxes (Musgrave 1984, 228).Under the
"benefit" principle, if a farmer with a high tax burden could show
that other landowners have less tax burdens while all receive the same
amount of property tax funded services, the argument for a
preferential assessment would be even stronger.In sum, the farmer
can have some economic incentive and some ideological justifications
of equity to lobby for a preferential assessment.
The link between the preferential assessment and the prevention
of farm sales appears to be much weaker than the link between the
program and equity objectives.While it may be impossible to
determine which perspective is more important in the popular
acceptance of the preferential assessment programs, some evaluations
of the programs have been made.To date the tendency among writers
has been to emphasize the malfunctions of the program under land
preservation goals.There is need for analysis of the programs under
equity goals.
8THE OREGON APPROACH
It is instructive to look at the Oregon preferential assessment
program in terms of equity for two reasons.On one hand, the
methodology of the Oregon program is generally representative of other
states' programs.On the other hand, the Oregon program is situated
in a uniquely complex state policy for land use planning, which helps
to illustrate the real and potential equity implications.
History and Intent
The first version of a preferential assessment program was
approved by the Oregon legislature in 1961.In the Oregon Revised
Statutes, sections 308.237 and 308.238, the law stated that zoned
farmland would be assessed at its true cash value for farm use.Thus,
the preferential assessment was termed a "use-value assessment."The
law provided that under certain conditions the farmer could get a
lower than market value assessment.To be eligible, the farmer was
required 1) to own at least five acres of land and 2) to have that
land within an agricultural zone.While the acreage limitation did
not generate a great deal of conflict over issues of fairness, the
zoning requirement did, and it caused the eventual repeal of the law.
The fact was that most of Oregon was unzoned and the majority of
farmers felt they were being treated unfairly by the law (Sullivan
1973, 9).
After the repeal of ORS 308.237 and 308.238 in the 1963
legislative session, a new use-value assessment law was passed that
included both zoned and unzoned farmland.This law retained the
five-acre size limit for qualification of farmlands but added a twistto the zoning requirement.Upon application for use-value status, the
owner of unzoned farmland had to agree that he/she would pay a penalty
or a rollback charge if farming ceased on the land or if the land was
sold to a non-farmer.This penalty was based on the difference
between the use-value and the market value for every year since the
land was first given use-value status (up to 5 years).Landowners of
zoned farmland were exempt from any deferred penalties (1963 ORS
308.370-308.395, 215.203, 215.213).
Minor changes were made to the 1963 law in the 1965 legislative
session, but significant changes were made in 1967.Simply having
five acres of land and demonstrating a farm use was no longer
adequate.Under the 1967 legislation, the owner of unzoned farmland
had to demonstrate that a minimum of $500 of gross income was earned
through agricultural use of the land (Sullivan 1973, 13).
The basic framework of the current preferential assessment
legislation combines both the 1963 law and tenets of the 1967 law.
Since the passage of Senate Bill 100 and the statewide planning goals
in 1973, zoned farmland has been referred to as Exclusive Farm Use
zones (EFU's).Land within these EFU's is automatically assessed at a
use-value and is subject to a deferral penalty (1983 ORS 308.399; see
Appendix A).Landowners of unzoned farmland must meet strict income
standards.To qualify under the law, a farmer who owns a unit of land
smaller than five acres must earn at least $500 of gross income from
it.On units larger than five acres but not more than twenty acres,
at least $100 of gross income per acre must be shown, and on units
larger than twenty acres the minimum requirement is $2,000 of total
10gross income.Unzoned farmland is also subject to a deferral penalty
which consists of a rollback charge of the deferred assessed value
multiplied by the number of years enrolled in the program (up to 10
years) plus an interest rate (1983 ORS 308.399; see Appendix A).
Considering the legislative changes since 1961, it can be seen
that the use-value assessment has been viewed as more than simply a
tool to preserve farmland.The program has been expanded to include
the majority of the state's farmers and modified to more closely
target the "bona fide" farmer.Both changes have been made to improve
the fairness of the program's administration.The stated intent of
the program illustrates how these changes have come about.
It is the legislative intent that the bona fide (farm)
properties shall be assessed at a value that is
exclusive of values attributable to urban influences
or speculative purposes.(1983 ORS 308.345)
The intent can be interpreted as a blanket rejection of free
market-based assessments on "bona fide properties."Thus, the program
has been broadened to include more farmers since 1961.But the term
"bona fide" suggests that only certain commercial farmers are
eligible.The stricter minimum acreage and income qualifications
passed in 1967 are representative of the attempt to target these
commercial farmers.
Initially, the legislative history of Oregon's use-value
assessment may appear rather straightforward.The intention has been
to give lower assessments on "bona fide" properties.However, "bona
fide property" is not an absolute or mutually exclusive definition of
a land use practice.For example, a person whose income is received
mostly from non-farm sources may be just as qualified for a use-value
11assesssment as a person whose income is derived from farming.There
is nothing inherently wrong with a landowner generating income from
both farm and non-farm sources; in fact, most farmers do (Census of
Agriculture 1978, 3)2.Because this is the case, it is difficult to
distinguish between landowners who should receive tax benefits and who
should pay for the benefits.This situation will be discussed in
greater detail later.
Planning Framework
In 1973 a statewide planning program was created by the passage
of SB 100 by the Oregon legislature.One part of this act established
the Exclusive Farm Use zones (EFU's).These zones are chosen by the
local governing body and are included in the state mandated
comprehensive plan of the locality.The plan and the respective EFU
zones are reviewed by the state's Land Conservation and Development
Commission so that the soil classes and types of agricultural use are
consistent with the predetermined statewide planning goals (Gustafson
et al. 1982, 336-367).
Goal 3 of the Oregon law (SB 100) is "to preserve and maintain
agricultural lands."This goal has been linked to the use-value
assessment program in ORS 215.243, which states:
Exclusive farm use zoning as provided by law,
substantially limits alternatives to the use of rural
land and, with the importance of rural lands to the
public, justifies incentives and privileges offered to
encourage owners of rural lands to hold such lands in
exclusive farm use zones.(1983 ORS 215.243)
This law justifies the use-value assessment of lands within an
EFU zone without any acreage or income qualifications.Specifically,
the lack of land use alternatives inherent in the zoning designation
12justifies the tax savings as encouragement to keep the land under EFU
status.So while the use-value assessment law and the state zoning
laws are designed to stand alone, the two laws are interrelated (Pease
1982, 547).
Some authors have argued that the combination of the use-value
assessment and the EFU zone has been successful in preserving
agricultural land (Banta 1980, 82). Indeed, the rate of farm
turnover has declined dramatically in Oregon since the late 1960's and
early 1970's (Furuseth 1981, 1).However, there is no evidence to
show that the two laws in combination or separately have had any
effect on the land use behavior of farmers, as opposed to the effects
of land values, crop prices, etc.What the EFU zoning can at least
provide is assistance in the identification of the beneficiaries of a
use-value assessment via the political process of the local
government.
In sum, both zoned and unzoned farmlands are recognized by the
Oregon use-value assessment laws.Zoned farmland is determined by
soil type, land use, and the political decisions of the local
governing body, and unzoned farmland is determined by land use, gross
income, and minimum acre size.This is a result of the legislative
attempt to accurately distinguish between the recipients and the
providers of property tax relief.
If it is assumed that the identification of recipients (farmers)
and providers (non-farmers) is a relatively simple process, the
resulting tax shifts of the use-value program can be shown and the
change in the distribution of tax burdens can be shown in terms of
13equity principles.But, considering the very real difficulties in
distinguishing between farmers and non-farmers, discussion of the
changes in tax burdens becomes much more complex.
Mechanics of the Use-Value Assessment
The use-value assessment affects the landowners by redistributing
the tax burdens within a taxing unit.This redistribution of property
tax burdens is dependent on the following parameters:1) the tax base
of the taxing unit, which is the total assessed value of all land and
non-land property; 2) the number of landowners under use-value status;
3) the amount of land under use-value status; and 4) the difference
between total use-value assessments and market value assessments
(Dunford & Marousek 1981, 222).To clarify these points it is helpful
to exemplify the process by using a fictitious taxing unit whereby the
distribution of tax burdens will be shown before and after a use-value
assessment on farmland.
As was shown earlier, the tax rate (R) of a taxing unit equals
the desired revenues (1), divided by the total assessed value,
i.e., tax base (B):
R=T
1
Therefore, if desired revenues are $1 million and the tax base is
$5 million, made up of $3 million of assessed value in farmland and
$2 million in assessed non-farm property, the tax rate equals .2.In
turn, taxes on farmland would be $600,000 ($3,000,000 x .2) and on
non-farm property, $400,000 ($2,000,000 x .2).It is assumed in this
case that the farm and the non-farm property are assessed at the true
cash value of the land.The distribution of tax burdens would
14theoretically follow line a on Figure 1.Those landowners near the
city center may be paying taxes per acre of land that are larger than
taxes paid by landowners further from the city, regardless of income
levels.
With the implementation of a use-value assessment, farm property
owners can be given non-market assessments which will change the tax
base (B) of the taxing unit.This change is defined by the difference
between the total market based assessed value on farmland (m) minus
the total use-value assessments on farmland (u).The difference (0)
between these two values is subtracted from the initial tax base (B)
of $5 million to determine the new tax base with the use-value
assessment program (B - D).If it is assumed that desired tax
revenues are the same as they were without the program, and that
use-value assessments on farmland are 50 percent of what market based
assessments would be, the tax rate increases and the burden of
payments shifts.The following illustrates these changes.
Ex. 1: R =1,000,000
B-U (2)
where: U = 3,000,000 - 1,500,000
= 1,500,000; and
B - U = 5,000,000 - 1,500,000
= 3,500,000
R = .28
The new tax rate of .28 would change the distribution of tax
payments to $420,000 on farm property and $560,000 on non-farm
property.Payments increase for non-farmers and decrease for farmers
due to the use-value assessments.The degree of this tax shift is
affected primarily by the characteristics of the factor U.
15amount of use-value assessed farmland compared to market assessed
land.Therefore, if a taxing unit's tax base consists mostly of
use-value assessed land and if the use-value assessment is a small
percentage of market value assessments, the shift would be large.
Conversely, if the tax base is made up of few properties assessed at
use-value, the tax shift would be smaller.In sum, the use-value
assessment can shift the tax burden from farm properties to non-farm
properties in a way that responds to the difference between market
values and use-values and in a way that responds to the amounts of
farmland (% of tax base) within a taxing unit.
In terms of equity, the use-value assessment is ideally intended
to redistribute income toward farmers as a group because they earn
less than non-farmers--25 percent less according to a Special Census
Report made in 1982 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1983, 11).Inthe
previous example, it was shown how the use-value assessment can shift
the tax burden away from farmers and thus compensate for the
difference in incomes between farmers and non-farmers.However, the
actual redistribution of tax burdens from the use-value assessment is
not as simple as this would imply.
USE-VALUE ASSESSMENTAND EQUITY
To understand the equity implications of the use-value
assessment, one critically important fact must be recognized:
Farmland, like many other natural resources, is defined by social,
political and legal decisions that reflect the needs of society.
Drawing from Erich Zimmermann's (1964) Introduction to World
Resources, farmland may be perceived as a resource that defies any
16objective definition (p. 8).As times and people have changed,
perceptions and definitions of farmland have changed.Nonetheless, in
order for the use-value assessment to distribute the burdens of the
property tax according to any equity rule, "bona fide" farmland must
be identified.Therefore, farmland must be defined (Ecker-Racz 1970,
94).
The Oregon definition of "bona fide" farmland is basedon the
qualifications of an EFU zone and for a use-value assessment (see
Appendix B).Basically, any land that meets the EFU zoning
requirements or that meets the parcel size and income requirements for
a use-value assessment is by definition classified as "bona fide
farmland."Thus, bona fide farmland owners represent a large group of
beneficiaries of tax relief from the use-value program.Yet, it is
obvious that not all bona fide farmers are identical.A broad
variation in farm income/non-farm income, intensity of agriculture,
value of land, etc. is cornon in Oregon.The variation in types of
farmland and farmers becomes important when the definitional
requirement of the use-value assessment is considered.
Several problems exist with the application of use-value
assessment to farmlands.These problems are addressed in the
following three sections:Entrance Qualifications, Variation of
Assessed-Use Value and Market Value, and Distribution of Benefits and
Costs.The first two sections emphasize the equity implications
among different types of farmers within taxing units; the third
addresses the broader equity issues relating to all landowners in
Oregon.
17Entrance Qualifications
Given the potential savings of a farm near the urban boundary
that receives a use-value assessment, it is not surprising thatmany
landowners attempt to get use-value status.Because of the variety
of farms and intensities of traditional farming practices, the
definition of "bona fide" farm use under the law has become nearly
all-encompassing (see Appendix B).Nearly any parcel, within any
zone, that is able to produce $500 of gross income per acre for one
year can be qualified for a use-value assessment.
A study made by the Bureau of Governmental Research (1979) in
Eugene, Oregon, showed that several cases existed in the
Eugene/Springfield urban service area in which non-traditional farmers
were considered bona fide farmers under the law.In one case, a
280-acre parcel in the planning stages of becoming a planned unit
development and zoned "tract" was eligible for the use-value
assessment.The parcel was classified as pasture land under the law
and was assessed at a use-value of $250.If the land had been
assessed at the residential rate, the tax would have been $120,000
(Bureau of Governmental Research 1979, 10).
In addition to developers being classified as bona fide farmers
under the use-value assessment, small-scale "hobby farmers" can
qualify for a use-value assessment.In a 1984 position paper adopted
by the Oregon Association of County Planning Directors, it was stated
that "many owners of small tracts are taking advantage of the farm
value assessment program to obtain significant property tax
reductions" (OACP 1984).This concern was based on the ease with
which landowners can meet the minimum gross income standards foruse-value assessments.
The examples of the developer and the hobby farmer represent two
extreme variations in the type of landowner thatcan be classified as
a bona fide farmer.The problems associated with these examples are
explained by the "ability to pay" principle of equity.If a
landowner's intention is not to farm the land for a profit, but to
simply meet the minimum prerequisite for use-value status, then other
landowners, farmers as well as non-farmers, must bear the burden of
the costs of higher tax rates.But, most importantly, the situation
can arise where two "bona fide" farmers, one whose farming is a
"hobby" and the other whose sole income is from farming, have the same
income but are taxed without regard to their income.This situation
is examined more thoroughly in the next section.
Variation of Assessed Value and Market Value
The work done by Robert Coughlin showed that market based
assessments are generally site related.Conversely, the use-value
assessment per acre is more consistent across a geographical region.
In turn, the potential tax savings from a preferential assessment to a
farmer can vary depending on where the property is located and how the
property is assessed.
Under Oregon law there are two methods used to assess the
use-value of farm property.The first is the comparable sales
approach, whereby the assessor uses sales data of similar parcels to
determine the assessed value per acre.Due to a lack of sufficient
sales for comparison, assessors rarely use this approach.3The second
and more comon approach is the capitalization of net farm income from
an acre of land (Regional Science Research Institute 1976, 224).The
19formula for this calculation is as follows:
AV=C+r
where:AV = assessed use-value
I= net farm income
C = capitalization rate chosen by the Oregon
Department of Revenue
r = local property tax rate
(3)
The assessed use-value will vary depending on the types of crops,
livestock, etc., and farmers will receive different use-value
assessments depending on the size, location, and market value of their
parcels of land.Likewise, the degree of the tax shift will be
affected by the variation in use-value assessments.In reconsidering
the earlier tax shift example, assume that only two farmers made up
the $3 million in assessed market value, and each owns $1.5 million
worth of assessed propertyIf farmer A happens to live near a
development project and his assessed use-value is 20 per cent of his
market assessed value, under the program he would have an assessed
value of $300,000.If farmer B's use-value was 50 percent of his
market assessment, his assessment would be $750,000.Total assessed
use-value would equal $1,050,000.The difference (0) between
$1,050,000 and the market based assessment on farmland of $3,000,000
is $1,950,000, which can be entered into equation 2 of the earlier tax
shift model.
Ex. 2: R = 1 000,000
5,OOO,00 - 1,950,000
R = .33
With a tax rate of .33 under the use-value program, farmer A would pay
20$99,000 and farmer B would pay $247,500, for a total of $346,500 for
both farmers (1,050,000 x .33).Non-farmers would pay $660,000
(2,000,000 x .33).
Under a use-value assessment program, farmer A's taxes are
considerably lower than they would be under a market value assessment
program, and they are considerably lower than farmer B's taxes.Both
farmers could conceivably have the same incomes, therefore equal under
the "ability to pay" principle, yet both may havevery different tax
burdens.In fact, farmer A may be able to pay more than farmer B
because he would have more collateral to borrow money.Admittedly the
example has generalized the problem a great deal and it is not meant to
suggest a farmer should have to borrow money to pay taxes.But the
example does show that the program can shift the tax burden without
regard to the "ability to pay" principle because the use-value
assessment process does not distinguish between different types of
farmers in different locations.
The Distribution of Benefits and Costs
The tax shift examples using equation 2, particularly Example 1,
showed that the tax rate is affected by the total assessed value and
the mix of farmland and non-farmland within a taxing unit.In turn,
total property taxes paid will vary across different taxing units,
whereby each taxing unit's total taxes are affected differently by the
use-value assessment.Consider two examples, one in which a taxing
unit is dominated by farm use and a second in which non-farm use is
dominant.Under the use-value assessment the burden from the market
value assessment is shifted from farmers to non-farmers in both cases.
But, in the taxing unit where farm use is dominant, the few non-farmers
21will receive a heavier burden than the non-farmers in the other taxing
unit.The main reason for this is that in units withmany use-value
assessed properties (farmers) the costs from the lower assessmentare
shifted to the few non-farmers.Likewise, the taxing unit that is
predominately under non-farm use will shift smaller burdens onto
non-farmers.Thus, the portion of total property taxes that is
attributable to the use-value assessment program willvary from taxing
unit to taxing unit.
The variation in property taxes attributable to the use-value
assessment program, i.e., costs, is seen by some authors asa logical
result derived from the unique characteristics of a particular taxing
unit.Drawing from the benefit principle, Lindholm et al. (1979, 35)
argued that the variation in costs is justified by the variation in
property tax-funded services in different taxing units.Ladd (1979)
expanded upon the benefit principle but reached very different
conclusions on the justification of the use-value assessment.The view
held by Ladd and others is that benefits and costs should be looked at
from a broader perspective than just within the taxing unit.Ladcl
(1979) argued that the benefits of the use-value program in fact reach
further than only the farmers within a taxing unit, whereas the costs
are targeted to only non-farmers within the unit (p. 35).This implies
that all citizens benefit in having use-value assessment, whether from
aesthetic desires to preserve open space or simply an altruistic desire
to shift tax burdens away from farmers.
As was discussed earlier, the benefit principle essentiallysays
that people should be taxed according to the amount of property
tax-funded services they receive.In terms of the use-valueassessment, this translates into the idea that farmers should get tax
relief because they require fewer services than non-farmers.While
this view is debatable, it clearly illustrates that under the benefit
principle of equity some attempt is made to align the benefits of
public service to the costs of property tax payments withina taxing
unit.According to the benefit principle, the benefits should be
accounted for through tax payments.Under the current use-value
assessment, the benefits to citizens outside the taxing unit represent
a spillover cost to those non-farmers within a taxing unit.For
example, urban residents may derive some satisfaction from farmers
receiving tax relief, but since there are no use-value properties
within their tax code area, they receive benefits at the expense of
landowners within taxing units that have use-value assessed property.
What (tan Rflnn?
To briefly surmiarize the equity issues relating to the use-value
assessment, it was that:tax benefits or savings can be allocated
without regard to ability to pay; tax burdens can be shifted to farmers
as well as to non-farmers; and under the benefit principle of equity,
non-farmers may receive additional burdens because some urban residents
receive benefits at no cost.The first two issues are inherently based
on the problem in identifying bona fide farmland; the latter issue is
based on the more ideological problem of fiscal federalism.These
problems are difficult to resolve, but some potential responses to them
can be identified.
The Oregon Association of County Planning Directors has offered a
variety of ways to address the first problem, i.e., the identification
of bona fide farmland (see Appendix C).One of the methods suggested
23is to change the use-value assessment program's eligibility requirement
of $500 of gross income.Specifically, it would require that the
purchase price of livestock be deducted from the gross income.This
would prevent a landowner from meeting the minimum income qualification
in a single transaction of buying and selling a few head of livestock.
Since livestock sales qualify many farmers on unzoned farmland for the
program, this approach would keep some landowners out of use-value
status (OACPD 1984, 1).
The planners also suggested that the current acreage and income
eligibility requirements that exist on unzoned farmland should be
applied to EFU lands.This would remove the automatic use-value
assessment on EFU lands and require farmers in those zones to
demonstrate a farm income in the same manner as non-zoned farm owners.
Currently proposed as RB 2232 (see Appendix 0), this approach could
keep some landowners out of use-value status and thereby prevent
unnecessary tax burdens on other landowners.
Both of these suggestions would improve the administration of the
use-value assessment given the established criteria for identifying
bona fide farmaind, i.e., income and acreage requirements.But, even
if the current cirteria is improved, implemented and enforced, some
landowners, e.g., developers, will be able to provide only token
farming efforts to receive tax savings.In turn, tax burdens due to
the use-value assessment can still be shifted away from those who may
be most able to pay.Thus, the problem relates back to the criteria
used to distinguish whether or not a farm is bona fide.
Ecker-Racz argued that a more direct approach in distinguishing
between farmers and non-farmers is logical as well as possible.
24Alaska, for example, defines farmlandas land that the owner receives
at least one-fourth of his/her income froman agriculture use
(Ecker-Racz, 1970, 95).In Oregon this type of criterion for
identifying bona fide farmland could removemany of the landowners who
may not be traditionally considered as farmers and make the use-value
assessment more responsive to the ability to pay of landowners.
Concerning the situation in which Ladd suggested that benefits
from the use-value program are received at no cost by residents in
taxing units with no farmland, Oregon can learn from other states'
attempts to broaden the program's tax base.The most common way to
charge all of the beneficiaries of the use-valueprogram has been to
finance tax relief to farmers from the state income tax, commonly
called a circuit breaker.Based on studies made on the application of
a circuit breaker in other states' programs, the advantages appear to
be twofold.First of all, the financing based on an income tax (based
on farm receipts) may provide a better indicator of the ability to pay
than the current dependence on land values (Lockner & Kim 1973, 238).
Secondly, all taxpayers would to some degree pay for the tax relief
allocated to farmers.The most difficult question would be in
determining how much, for example, an urban resident should contribute.
Oregon income taxes are currently higher than the national average
(Kelly & Weber 1984, 3) and current sales tax proposals intended to
lower income tax burdens make it unlikely that voters would approveany
further increase in state taxes.Nonetheless, this approach may
provide an alternative for Oregon in the future.
25SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The nationwide popularity of preferential property tax assessments
began in the 1960's with the public's heightenedawareness of
decreasing farmland acreage.It remains to be seen whether the
preferential assessment was originally intended to servea policy goal
of farmland preveration, tax relief, or a combination of both.Most
studies relating to the preferential assessment have emphasized its
inability to preserve farmland.If those studies are accurate, the
next logical step is to investigate the preferential assessment's
justification as a tax relief measure.On only rare occasions has the
preferential program been examined from this perspective.
A prerequisite to any tax relief measure is that the beneficiaries
and the contributors be identified.In terms of the preferential
assessment, farmland must be distinguished from non-farmland.If this
can be accomplished, the preferential program must then be evaluated on
its ability to shift tax burdens away from farmers based on some accept
concept of equity.Equity has traditionally been based on two
principles:the ability to pay and the benefits that equal taxes.
Examination of the Oregon use-value assessment program has shown
that since 1967 two criteria exist for identifying bona fide farmland.
The land must be zoned EFU or it must meet certain income and acreage
requirements.Given several years of modifications, the use-value
assessment has more closely targeted the landowners that meet the
established criteria.However, when the program is applied, it can be
seen that tax burdens are not necessarily shifted away from those least
able to pay and that some people may receive benefits at no cost.
26This report has shown that:
1.Certain "bona fideu farmers, i.e., hobby farmers and
developers, who are presumably very able topay, may be taxed less than
others with less ability to pay.
2.The use-value assessment compared to market value assessment
can shift tax burdens not only from farmers to non-farmers but from
certain farmers to other farmers as well, dependingon the location of
the property, regardless of the ability topay.
3.There may be additional tax burdens on residents of taxing
units that have farmland within their boundaries because of the
benefits at no cost received by residents in totally urban taxing
units.
Each of these situations reflect on the problem of identifying the
beneficiaries and the contributors of the tax relief measure.More
specifically, they relate to the criteria used to define bona fide
farmland.The inherent variation in people's perceptions of farmland
makes the categorization of farmers and non-farmers very difficult, and
under the current criteria for defining farmland, there is some grounds
for objecting to the program based on equity principles.
The Oregon program could be modified to more accurately classify
farmers and non-farmers given the current income and acreage criteria,
but it is also possible to change the criteria and redefine "bona fide
farmland."Other states are dealing with equity implications and are
using new definitions of farmland.Policymakers and citizens of Oregon
might benefit from keeping an eye on these programs and possibly
reconsider the goals concerning the use-value assessment.
27Footnotes
1.Relying on the economic theory of the "median voter model"
(see Musgrave and Musgrave 1984, 104-105), farmers area minority and
would need the support of other voters ("citizens") topass a
preferential tax program.
2.In 1978 the Bureau of the Census estimated that approximately
62 percent of farmers worked off the farm for more than one daya year,
59 percent for more than 49 days per year (Census of Agriculture 1978,
3).
3.The comparable sales approach is only used if purchases have
been made by "prudent investors."A prudent investment is defined by
ORS 308.345, which generally states that the buyer must have a
"reasonable expectation" that the average annual return from the land
will not be less than the current rate of interest charged by the
Federal Land Bank on first mortgages on farmland.References
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30APPENDICESAppendix A
308.399 Penalty when land disqualified for special assessment;
exception to penalty assessment.(1) Except as otherwise provided
in subsections (3) and (4) of this section, when land which has
received special assessment as farm use land under ORS 308.370
(1) thereafter becomes disqualified for such assessment under
ORS 308.397, the assessor shall notify the owner thereof and there
shall be added to the tax extended against the land on the next
general property tax roll, to be collected and distributed in the
same manner as the remainder of the real property tax, an additional
tax equal to 10 times (or such lesser number of times, corresponding
to the years of farm use zoning applicable to such property) the
total amount by which the taxes assessed against the land would have
been increased if it had been valued without regard to ORS 308.370
(1) during the last year beginning after October 5, 1973, in which
such farm use assessment was in effect for the land.
(2) The amount determined to be due as an additional tax under
subsection (1) of this section may be paid to the tax collector prior
to the completion of the next general property tax roll, pursuant to
ORS 311.370.
(3) No amount shall be imposed under subsection (1) of this
section upon an owner of land that has received special assessment
as farm use land under ORS 308.370 (1), if the land becomes
disqualified for such special assessment because:
(a) The land is acquired by a governmental agency as result of
the lawful exercise of the power of eminent domain or the threat or
iminence thereof; or
(b) The land ceases to be located within the boundaries of an
exclusive farm use zone as the result of a change in the boundaries
of the zone or removal of the zone following an action by the
governing body of the county that was not requested or initiated
by the owner of the land.
(4) In making the computation of additional tax or penalty under
subsection (1) of this section, the phrase "five times" shall be
substituted for the phrase "10 times8if the land, upon disqualifi-
cation for special assessment is located within an urban growth
boundary.
(5) As used in this section, "urban growth boundary" means an
urban growth boundary contained in a city or county comprehensive
plan that has been acknowledged by the Land Conservation and
Development Commission pursuant to ORS 197.251 or an urban growth
boundary that has been adopted by a metropolitan service district
council under ORS 268.390 (3).[1973 c.503 sec.6; 1979 c.350
sec.6; 1981 c.791 sec.4]
(Source:Oregon Revised Statutes 1983, p. 109.)
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215.203 Zoning ordinances establishing exclusive farmuse zones;
definitions.(1) Zoning ordinances may be adopted to zone designated
areas of land within the county as exclusive farm use zones.Land
within such zones shall be exclusively for farmuse except as
otherwise provided in ORS 215.213 or 215.283.Farm use zones shall
be established only when such zoning is consistent with thecompre-
hensive plan.
(2) (a) As used in this section, "farm use" means the current
employment of land for the primary purpose of obtaining a profit in
money by raising, harvesting and selling crops or by the feeding,
breeding, management and sale of, or the produce of, livestock,
poultry, fur-bearing animals or honeybees or for dairying and the
sale of dairy products or any other agricultural or horticultural
use or animal husbandry or any combination thereof."Farm use"
includes the preparation and storage of the products raised on such
land for human use and animal use and disposal by marketingor
otherwise.It does not include the use of land subject to the
provisions of ORS chapter 321, except land used exclusively for
growing cultured Christmas trees as defined in subsection (3)
of this section.
(Source:Oregon Revised Statutes 1983, 414)
308.372 Qualifications for exclusive farm use; gross income;
acreage; penalties for failure to notify assessor of noncompliance.
(1) For purposes of ORS 215.203, 215.213, 215.283 and 308.345 to
308.403, farmland that is not within an area zoned for farm use
under ORS 215.010 to 215.190 and 215.402 to 215.438, is not used
exclusively for farm use unless in three out of the five calendar
years immediately preceding the assessment date the farmland was
operated as a part of a farm unit that has produced a gross income
from farm uses in the amount provided in subsection (2) of this
section.As used in this section, "gross income" includes the
value of any crop or livestock that is used by the owner personally
or in his farming operation, but shall not include the value of any
crop or livestock so used unless records accurately reflecting both
value and use of the crop or livestock are kept by the owner in
a manner consistent with generally accepted accounting principles.
The burden of proving the gross income of the farm unit for the
years described in this subsection is upon the person claiming
special assessment for the land.
(2)(a) If the farm unit consists of less than five acres,
the gross income amount required by subsection (1) of this
section shall be at least $500.
(b) If the farm unit consists of five acres but does not
consist of more than 20 acres, the gross income amount required
32by subsection (1) of this section shall be at least equal to the
product of $100 times the number of acres andany fraction of
an acre of land included.
(C) If the farm unit consists of more than 20 acres, the gross
income amount required by subsection (1) of this section shall be
least $2,000.
(d) In arriving at the number of acres for purposes of this
section, the land described in ORS 215.203 (2)(b) and the land, not
exceeding one acre, used as a homestead shall not be included.
(Source:Oregon Revised Statutes 1983, 105)
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The following is an excerpt of an unpublished position paper entitled
Farm Value Assessment Program Changes, adopted by the Association of
County Planning Directors, November 29, 1984:
Since the advent of the State Land Use Goals counties have been
required to place large areas of rural land in EFU zones and to impose
restrictions on creation of new non-farm parcels and homesites.
Properties in an EFU zone can qualify for assessment at farm value if
the property is in "farm use."There is evidence that many owners of
small tracts are taking advantage of the farm value assessment program
to obtain significant property tax reductions.Counties are finding
it difficult to justify the use of the corrinerical agricultural
standard to judge proposals for new farm parcels or dwellings and
imposition of paybacks and penalties for new non-farm dwellings, when
others, who already have a dwelling, are able to obtain a property tax
reduction without being commercial farmers.
POSITION:The County Planning Directors support legislation that
addresses the following concerns.
The farm valuation program allows a property owner in a non-farm zone
to meet the income test and have property assessed at farm value on
the basis of the gross sales price of livestock.The owner can
purchase and resell a few head of cattle the same day and meet the
income test.There is evidence that most properties in non-farm zones
that qualify for special assessment qualify on the basis of livestock
sales.
POSITION:The County Planning Directors support chan9es that will
eliminate this abuse of this program.One way to achieve this is to
require the deduction from gross income of the purchase price of the
livestock.
In farm zones there are many tracts that are smaller than the typical
size of commercial agricultural operations.If those lands are put to
farm use the Assessors must assess the land at farm value.Minimal
farming activity is enough to remain qualified.This results in a
significant reduction in the assessed value of land in farming zones
and shifts the tax burden to urban and rural landowners who are not on
farm deferral.
POSITION:The County Planning Directors feel strongly that "farm use
with the primary purpose of obtaining a profit" is too easy a standard
for special assessment compared to the intent of farm zones to
maintain commercial agriculture.One way to correct this is to apply
the income test in farm zones on substandard size parcels with a
dwelling.A substandard parcel is smaller than the minimum parcel
size in the applicable zone or smaller than 20 acres in a farm zone
with no minimum lot size.
34Appendix 0
The following item entitled "Bill restricts hobby farms," written by
Foster Church, appeared in The Oregonian, April 25, 1985, page C12:
SALEM Small "hobby farms" would have three years to start
producing cash crops or their property taxes would go up under a bill
approved Wednesday by the House Revenue Committee.
The Committee approved HB 2232, which would make it more
difficult for owners of small farms to claim farm use assessments for
property tax purposes if their property does not actually produce farm
income.
The measure, which is controversial because of the growing number
of small-farm owners in the state, has an array of different forces
for and against it, and even farm organizations are not of one
position.
The Oregon Farm Bureau opposes the bill.But the coirmittee heard
testimony from other farmers not associated with the bureau who
support the bill on the grounds that when non-producting farms get the
same tax treatment as working operations, tax rates rise accordingly.
The bill as it is now written would apply an income test to farms
in order to get farm use assessments.At a minimum lot size of 20
acres, an owner would have to produce a gross farm income of at least
$2,000 to qualify.
Smaller properties, up to five acres, would have to make about
$100 an acre to be eligible.Farms of five acres or less would have
to make $500.
The bill would apply stricter guidelines to the land beneath a
homestead site.In order to for it to be eligible, the property would
have to produce $5,000 in gross farm income.
Taxation of farm land has been controversial, since farm lands in
exclusive farm use zones -- particularly those close to urban areas --
yield so much more tax revenue when assessed at market rather than
farm value.
The Legislative Revenue Office estimates that if property is
assessed for farm use at $200 to $300 an acre, often its market value
could be $1,000 or more an acre.
The effective date for the bill would be 1988, which would give
owners of non-working farms time to produce the necessary income to
meet farm assessment requirements.
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